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ABSTRACT
This paper builds an evolutionary model of an industry where firms produce dif-
ferentiated products. Firms have diﬀerent average cost functions and diﬀerent demand
functions. Firms are assumed to be totally irrational in the sense that firms enter the
industry regardless of the existence of profits; firms’ outputs are randomly determined
rather than generated from profit maximization problems; and firms exit the industry
if their wealth is negative. It shows that without purposive profit maximization as-
sumption, monopolistic competition still evolves in the long run. The only long run
survivors are those that possess the most eﬃcient technology, face the most favorable
market conditions and produce at their profit maximizing outputs. This paper modifies
and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition.
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1 Introduction
The notion of monopolistic competition was invented in responding to the severe lim-
itation in conducting economic analysis using a framework of either pure competition
or pure monopoly. Monopolistic competition has elements of both pure competition
and pure monopoly. It examines an industry where competing firms produce similar
but diﬀerent commodities. Due to the product diﬀerentiation, each firm has a certain
degree of monopoly power. This is reflected in firms’ downward-slope demand curves.
The free entry and exit condition along with firms’ profit maximization behavior leads
the industry to long-run zero profits. The corresponding firms’ outputs are the ones
that maximize their respective profits. In other words, they produce at the tangency
point where their demand curves are tangent to their respective average cost curves.
Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) both derive this same equilibrium using diﬀer-
ent techniques. In their derivation of this equilibrium, they both heavily rely on the
rationality and purposive profit maximization behavior on firms’ part.
However, there are a variety of reasons that firms cannot possibly maximize their
profits or profit maximization may not be their objective (see Baumol (1959), Williamson
(1964), Simon (1979), Arrow (1986), Andrews (1949), and Cyert and March (1963)).
Without the purposive profit maximization behavior, could monopolistic competition
still arrives as a long-run equilibrium? Could the classic argument for the derivation of
monopolistic competition still holds?
The early literature (e.g., Alchian (1950), Enke (1951), Friedman (1953)) presents
market selection argument to validate profit maximization hypothesis. Alchian (1950)
writes "Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of success and
viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such
2
success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is suﬃcient. This is the criterion
by which the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are
the survivors; those who suﬀer losses disappear.". Enke (1951) presents more details
on how the market selection works. Enke (1951) says that "In the long run, however,
if firms are in active competition with one another rather than constituting a number
of isolated monopolies, natural selection will tend to permit the survival of only those
firms that either through good luck or great skill have managed, almost or completely,
to optimize their position and earn the normal profits necessary for survival. In these
instances the economist can make aggregate predictions as if each and every firm knew
how to secure maximum long-run profits.". Friedman (1953) also advocates that "The
process of natural selection thus helps to validate the hypothesis (of profit maximization)
or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on
the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival."
Later, Winter (1964, 1971), and Nelson and Winter (1982) further examine this
market selection argument in the context of retained earnings dynamics. They found that
the retained earnings of profit maximizers will grow fastest and eventually those firms
will dominate the market. Nelson and Winter (1982) present a partial equilibrium model
where prices are fixed and all firms have access to the same technology; it shows that
"as if " profit maximization describe the long run steady state of firms’ behavior. Dutta
and Radner (1999), and Blume and Easley (2002) examine whether natural selection
favors profit maximizing firms in models with added capital market, where firms can
grow through retained earnings or through financing in the capital markets. Dutta and
Radner (1999) shows that all surviving firms are not profit maximizing firms. Blume and
Easley (2002) shows that the market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but the
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long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is not well described by the equilibrium
models based on the profit maximization hypothesis.
Luo (1995, 2007) present two evolutionary models of industry dynamics, which sup-
port the profit maximization hypothesis through the market selection arguments. Fur-
thermore, in both papers, the long-run behavior of the industries is consistent with the
one based on the profit maximization hypothesis. The papers basically says that even
though firms are not maximizing their profits (their outputs are randomly determined
upon their entry to the industry), natural selection selects for the firms that happen to
produce at profit maximizing outputs, which in turn promote rational aggregate mar-
ket outcomes. Specifically, Luo (1995) examines an industry where all firms produce a
homogenous commodity. It formally proves that with firms’ total irrationality, perfect
competition as a long run equilibrium evolves with the "as if " profit maximizers as
the only survivors. Luo (2007) obtains similar conclusion in examining a more complex
industry structure where firms produce similar but diﬀerentiated products. Namely, the
monopolistic competition arrives as a long run outcome where only the "as if" profit
maximizers survive. Luo (2007) assumes the symmetric demand function and identical
average cost function for all firms. However, this paper builds on these models and
assumes the non-symmetric demand function and non-identical average cost function
for all firms. Specifically, this paper constructs an evolutionary model of an industry
where firms produce similar but diﬀerentiated products and each firm has its own in-
herent demand and average cost function. Firms enter the industry sequentially over
time. Each firm’s output is randomly determined upon its entry and fixed thereafter.
If a firm realizes a profit, the profit becomes a part of its wealth. If a firm’s wealth
is positive at the beginning of a period, the firm will continue to produce its product
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next period; otherwise, the firm exits the industry at the end of that time period. The
nonnegative wealth serves as a market selection criterion. This type of modelling strat-
egy completely rules out firms’ rationality in their decision of entry to the industry, exit
from the industry; and in the determination of the level of their outputs to produce. The
paper concludes that with non-symmetric demand function and non-identical average
cost function, not all "as if " profit maximizers will survive. The firms producing at
their minimum eﬃcient scales will not survive. The only survivors in the long run are
the "as if " profit maximizers who possess the most eﬃcient technology and face the
most favorable market conditions. In aggregate, monopolistic competition arises in the
long run. This paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of
monopolistic competition. In other words, firms’ rationality is not needed in achieving
monopolistic competition. In addition, the long run survivors produce at a suboptimal
level of output (less than their minimum eﬃcient scales). This is consistent with the
empirical findings in the industrial organization literature (see Weiss (1963 and 1976),
Scherer (1973), and Pratten (1971)) that a majority of firms are not only small but also
small enough so as to operate at a suboptimal level of output (instead of the minimum
eﬃcient scale) in most industries.
2 The Model
Consider an industry where firms enter sequentially over time, producing a similar but
diﬀerentiated products. For simplicity, one firm is assumed to enter the industry each
time period. The firm that enters at time period t, where t = 1, 2, ..., is referred to as
firm t. Firm i, where i = 1, 2, ..., produces a level of output αQi, where α is a positive
parameter and it reflects the size of the firm relative to the market and where Qi is
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randomly taken upon entry period from the interval [Q,Q], 0 < Q < Q < +∞.
The demand function for firm i, i = 1, 2, ..., at time t, t ≥ i, is as follows,
P it (αQ
i) = Ai
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1−
X
j∈St−1
j 6=i
BjαQj
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− a
iαQi, (1)
where the parameters Ai, Bj, and ai belong to the intervals [A,A], [B,B], and [a, a],
0 <A < A < +∞, 0 < B < B < +∞, and 0 <a < a < +∞, respectively. Ai is firm i’s
price-intercept when all other firms are producing zero output. From hereon, Ai will be
referred to as firm i’s base intercept of its demand curve. St−1 is a set of firms that enter
before time period t and are producing at time period t, excluding firm t. The above
indicates that diﬀerent firms’ demand curves may have diﬀerent slopes and diﬀerent
intercepts, but each firm has the same impact (i.e., Bj is the same for i = 1, 2, ...) on
the intercepts of all other firms’ demand curves.
There is entry cost in the industry. Firm i0s average entry cost is assumed to be
βik, where βi ∈ [β, β], 0 < β < β < +∞, and k > 0. Firm i0s entry cost incurs only
upon entry and there are no longer entry costs for firm i in all subsequent time periods
after its entry.
Firm i’s average cost functions is denoted as Ci(·), Ci(·) is continuous and it has a
negative first derivative and a positive second derivative, i.e., ∂C
i(Qi)
∂Qi < 0,
∂2Ci(Qi)
∂Qi2
> 0.
Furthermore, for given parameters Q∗ and Q
∗
, where Q∗ >Q and Q
∗
< Q, there exists
a Q∗i ∈ [Q∗, Q
∗
] such that
∂C i(Q i)
∂Q i
|
Q i=Q∗i
= −ai (2)
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and
Ci(Q∗i ) = c
∗
i . (3)
The parameters Ai, Bi, ai, Qi, βi, and c∗i are firm i-specific and they are, in the
beginning of firm i’s entry period, randomly and mutually independently taken from
the intervals [A,A], [B,B], [a, a], [Q,Q], [β, β], and [c∗, c∗] according to some given
distributions with full support. In addition, firm i’s average cost function Ci(·) is firm-i
specific. It is also drawn, after the values of ai and c∗i are taken, in the beginning of firm
i’s entry period from U i according to a given distribution with full support, where2
U i = {f(·) : [Q,Q]→ (c,+∞), f(·) is continuous and f 0(·) < 0, f 00(·) > 0;
furthermore, there exists Q∗i ∈ [Q∗, Q
∗
] such that f(Q∗i ) = c
∗
i , f
0(Q∗i ) = −ai}
Since the purpose of this paper is to show the convergence of the industry to a mo-
nopolistically competitive equilibrium where the size of each firm is infinitesimally small
relative to the market demand, it is necessary to transform the average cost function of
each firm as a function of the scale parameter (α) while preserving the relevant prop-
erties of the original average cost function. This α− transformation is an eﬀective way
of shrinking the scale of the firm relative to the aggregate market demand. This tech-
nique has been used in papers such as Novshek (1985), Robson (1990), Luo (1995) and
Luo (2007). The shrinking of the scale parameter α towards zero represents increased
competition among firms.
2The reason for conditioning the choice of Ci(·) on the values of ai and c∗i is to ensure that for any
given demand curve there exists Q∗i ∈ [Q∗, Q
∗
] at which a shifted demand curve would eventually be
tangent to firm i’s average cost curve. Otherwise, a random picking of Ci(·) might mean no such tan-
gency would occur for Qi ∈ [Q∗, Q∗]. From the perspective of analyzing a monopolistically competitive
equilibrium, this would be uninteresting.
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The α−transformed average cost function for firm i is defined as Ciα(·) according to
Ciα(Q
i) = Ci(
Qi
α
) + ai
µ
Qi
α
−Q∗i
¶
− ai
¡
Qi − αQ∗i
¢
. (4)
If α = 1, Ciα(·) is the same as Ci(·). This α−transformed average cost function for firm i
generates a family of average cost functions, which shifts towards the Y-axis as α shrinks
towards zero and it preserves the same slope and the same magnitude of the firm i0s
cost function at the output level αQ∗ as α shrinks. Furthermore, firm i0s average cost
at the output level of αQi is above the corresponding point on the tangent line to firm
i0s average cost curve going through the point (αQ∗i , c∗i ). These properties of firm i0s
average cost function are formally stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (1) For any given α, Ciα(αQ∗i ) = Ci(Q∗i ) = c∗i for any i = 1, 2, ...
(2) For any given α, ∂C
i
α(αQi)
∂(αQi) |
αQi=αQ∗i
= ∂C
i(Qi)
∂Qi |
Qi=Q∗i
= −ai; for any i = 1, 2, ...
(3) Ciα(αQi) ≥ c∗i + aiα(Q∗i −Qi).
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof.
In addition, this α−transformation ensures that firm i0s profit maximizing point Q∗i
remain the same. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Firm i’s normalized per unit profit at time period t, where t ≥ i ≥ 1, is defined as
Πit(αQi) according to
Πit(αQ
i) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P it (αQ
i)−Ciα(αQi)−βik
Ai , if i = t
P it (αQ
i)−Ciα(αQi)
Ai , if i < t.
(5)
Then, the following is true.
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Proposition 2 the normalized per unit profit for firm i that produces at αQ∗i is maxi-
mized, i.e.,
Πit(αQ
i) |
Qi=Q∗i
≥ max
Qi∈[Q,Q]
Πit(αQ
i). (6)
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof.
Luo (1995) and Luo (2007) presents their models where all firms have the conventional
symmetric demand curves and the same average cost curves. Both papers show that the
ultimate surviving firms are those that act as if they were profit maximizers. Obviously,
in this more general setting where firms have diﬀerent demand curves and diﬀerent
average cost curves, some firms have more technological advantage or face better market
conditions. Interesting questions to be asked are whether the long run survivors are still
those that happen to produce at their profit maximizing outputs; and, whether more
eﬃcient technologies and better market conditions play any role in determining the long
run survivors.
The following proposition shows that each time period with a strictly positive proba-
bility (however small) firms enter with the most eﬃcient technology and facing the best
market conditions along with producing at their profit maximizing outputs.
Proposition 3 For any given  > 0, there exists a θ ∈ [0, 1] , such that for i = 1, 2, ...,
Pr
³
Ciα(αQi) ∈ [c∗i , c∗i + ], C
i
α(αQi)
Ai ∈ [
c∗
A
, c
∗
A
+ 
A
]
´
= θ > 0.
Proof. See appendix A for the proof.
Remark: Essentially, Proposition 3 says that in each time period, there is a strictly
positive probability that a firm enters, producing at the tangency of its average cost
curve to its demand curve, having the most eﬃcient technology and facing the best
market conditions. In fact, those firms resemble the profit maximizing firms and have
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the ratio of its profit maximizing average cost to the base intercept of its demand curve
being the smallest among all firms producing at tangency points.
A firm’s wealth at the end of a time period is defined as an accumulative profits up to
the end of that time period. If a firm’s wealth at the end of one time period is negative,
then this firm must exit the industry at the end of that time period. Otherwise, this firm
will continue to produce in the next time period. This assumption serves as a market
selection criterion. The detail dynamics of the industry is described in the following.
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no firm in the industry at the initial time
period. At the beginning of time period 1, only one firm (called firm 1) enters the
industry, producing αQ1 of product 1. The price of product 1 at time 1 is P 11 (αQ1) =
A1(1 −
P
i∈S0
(BiαQi)) − a1αQ1, where S0 is a set of firms that have entered before time
period 1 and are producing in time period 1. By the assumption, S0 = φ. Hence, the
price for product 1 of firm 1 is P 11 (αQ1) = A1 − a1αQ1. Firm 1’s total entry cost is
β1kαQ1 and its average cost is Cα(αQ1). It follows that firm 1’s profit at time 1 is
(P 11 (αQ1)−Cα(αQ1)− β1k)αQ1. Firm 1’s wealth at the end of time period 1 is defined
as W 11 = (P 11 (αQ1)−Cα(αQ1)− β1k)αQ1. Firm 1 continues to produce αQ1 of product
1 at time 2 if W 11 ≥ 0 and otherwise exits the industry at the end of time 1.
At the beginning of time period 2, another firm (labeled as firm 2) enters the industry,
producing αQ2 of product 2. The price for product 2 at time 2 is P 22 (αQ2) = A2(1 −P
i∈S1
(BiαQi)) − a2αQ2, where S1 is a set of firms, which entered in time period 1 and
are continuing to produce at time 2. Specifically, S1 = {1 :W 11 ≥ 0} ∪ φ. Firm 2’s total
entry cost is β2kαQ2 and its average cost is Cα(αQ2); hence, firm 2’s profit at time 2 is
(P 22 (αQ2)−Cα(αQ2)− β2k)αQ2. Firm 2’s wealth at the end of time period 2 is defined
as W 22 = (P 22 (αQ2)−Cα(αQ2)− β2k)αQ2. Firm 2 continues to produce αQ2 of product
10
2 at time 3 if W 22 ≥ 0 and otherwise exits at the end of its entry period 2.
If firm 1 is producing αQ1 of product 1 at time 2 (i.e., firm 1 has had a nonnegative
wealth at time 1), then firm 1 has survived period 1 and continues producing αQ1
of product 1 in the industry in time period 2. Firm 1’s product price at time 2 is
P 12 (αQ1) = A1(1−
P
i∈S1∪{2},i6=1
(BiαQi))− a1αQ1. Note that the entry firm (i.e., firm 2)
is included from the intercept of firm 1’s demand function at time period 2. If firm 1’s
wealth is nonnegative at the end of time period 1, then firm 1’s wealth at the end of time
period 2 is defined as an accumulative profits up to the end of time period 2. That is,
W 12 = W 11+ (P 12 (αQ1) − Cα(αQ1))αQ1. Furthermore, firm 1 continues to produce αQ1
of product 1 at time 3 if firm 1’s wealth is nonnegative at time 2 (i.e., W 12 ≥ 0) and
otherwise, firm 1 exits at the end of time period 2.
This process goes on and on. In general, at the beginning of time t, one firm (labeled
as firm t) enters the industry, producing αQt of product t. The price of product t at time
t is P tt (αQt) = At(1−
P
i∈St−1
(BiαQi))−atαQt, where St−1 is a set of firms, which entered
before and in time period t− 1 and are still producing at time t, i.e., St−1 = {i ≤ t− 1 :
W ii ≥ 0, W it0 ≥ 0 for all t0 ∈ (i, t− 1]} ∪ φ, where W ii = (P ii (αQi)− Cα(αQi)− βik)αQi
and W it0 =W
i
t0−1+(P
i
t0−1(αQ
i)−Cα(αQi))αQi for all t0 ∈ (i, t− 1]. In other words, St−1
is a set of firms that have survived all time periods up to the end of time period t− 1
and remain in the market at time t. Firm t’s total entry cost is βtkαQt and its average
cost is Cα(αQt); hence, firm t’s profit at time t is (P tt (αQt)−Cα(αQt)− βtk)αQt. Firm
t0s wealth is W tt = (P tt (αQt)−Cα(αQt)− βtk)αQt. Firm t continues to produce αQt of
product t at time t + 1, if firm t’s wealth is nonnegative and otherwise firm t exits at
the end of time period t.
If firm i, where i < t, has nonnegative wealth in all time periods before time t, (i.e.,
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W ii ≥ 0, W it0 ≥ 0 for all t0 ∈ (i, t−1]), then firm i has survived all time periods up to the
end of time t− 1 and remains producing αQi of product i in the industry in time period
t. Firm i’s product price at time t is P it (αQi) = Ai(1−
P
j∈St−1∪{t},j 6=i
(BjαQj))− aiαQi.
Note that the entry firm (i.e., firm t) is included from the intercept of firm i’s demand
function at time period t. If firm i’s wealth is nonnegative at the end of time period
t − 1, then firm i’s wealth at the end of time period t is defined as an accumulative
profits up to the end of time period t. That is, W it =W it−1+ (P it (αQi)− Cα(αQi))αQi.
Furthermore, firm i continues to produce αQi of product i at time t+1 if firm i0s wealth
is nonnegative at time t (i.e., W it ≥ 0) and otherwise, firm i exits at the end of time
period t.
To ensure that all firms producing at arbitrarily close to their profit maximizing
outputs can potentially make positive profits upon their entry periods, it is assumed
that Ai > c∗i +β
ik for i = 1, 2, .... Otherwise, no such firm can make positive profit upon
its entry period and consequently no such firm can survive in the industry for more than
one period.
3 The Results
Under the firm-specific cost curves and the firm-specific demand curves, the following
theorem shows that as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the
market, as the entry cost becomes suﬃciently small, and as time gets suﬃciently large,
the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium,
where the only surviving firms are those producing at outputs on their average cost
curves tangent to their demand curves, and furthermore at these outputs the ratios of
their average costs to the base intercepts of their demand curves are the smallest among
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all firms producing at tangency outputs. Firms that have such smallest ratios are those
having the most eﬃcient technologies and facing the best market conditions. The results
are precisely stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any given positive numbers  and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive num-
bers α and k such that, for any α < α and for 2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time
period τ(, η, α, k) such that, for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
(i(a))
Pr
⎛
⎜⎝
c∗A
i
A
+ aiα (Qi∗ −Qi) < P it (αQi) < c∗A
i
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + ,
for all i ∈ {t} ∪ St
⎞
⎟⎠ > 1− η;
(i(b))
Pr
⎛
⎜⎝
c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) < P it (αQi) < c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + ,
for i ∈ {t} ∪ St ∩
½
i0 :
c∗i0
Ai0
∈
∙
c∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

2A+A
¸¾
.
⎞
⎟⎠ > 1− η;
(ii) with probability of at least 1− η, each of the remaining firms, say firm i, is the
one with
c∗i
Ai
∈
∙
c∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

A
¸
and having the average costs lying in the interval
[c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) , c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + ) , i.e.,
Pr
⎛
⎜⎝
c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) ≤ Ciα(αQi) < c∗i + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + 
and
c∗i
Ai
∈
∙
c∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

A
¸
, for all i ∈ St
⎞
⎟⎠ > 1− η;
(iii) with probability of at least 1−η, no new entrant firm, say firm t, with the average
cost lying outside the interval [c∗t + atα (Q∗t −Qt) , c∗t + atα (Q∗t −Qt) + ) or satisfying
c∗t
At
/∈
∙
c∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

A
¸
can make positive profit by entry. That is, for firm t, producing αQt,
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where Ctα(αQt) /∈ [c∗t + atα (Q∗t −Qt) , c∗t + atα (Q∗t −Qt) + ) or
c∗t
At
/∈
∙
c∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

A
¸
,
Pr
¡
P tt (αQ
t)− Ctα(αQt)− βtk < 0
¢
> 1− η.
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
Remark: Shrinking the α and k represents ways of shrinking the scale of firms relative to
the market and shrinking entry costs to zero, respectively. As the α and k get smaller,
the industry eventually comes closer to monopolistic competition as time goes by. In
the limit, monopolistic competition evolves as a long run outcome of the industry where
firms are producing at the tangency of their average cost curves to their respective
demand curves, where firms are infinitesimally small relative to the market and where
there is no entry barrier. The technical characterizations of the long run equilibrium
outcomes are provided in Theorem 1. According to Part (ib), prices of all producing firms
are arbitrarily close to c∗i where their average cost curves is tangent to their respective
demand curves. Notice from part (ia)that the prices for some firms could be below
their average costs (due to c∗A
i
A
< c∗i ). Nevertheless, part (ii) indicates that such firms
would not survive in the long run. According to part (ii), the only surviving firms
are those producing at arbitrarily close to the tangency of their average cost curves
to their respective demand curves (i.e., resembling profit maximizing firms), and using
a technology arbitrarily close to the most eﬃcient technology (with c∗) and serving a
market arbitrarily close to the largest market (with A) (i.e., facing the best market
conditions). Furthermore, part (iii) indicates that no new entrant firms not producing
at arbitrarily close to the tangency output or not having the most eﬃcient technology
or not facing the best market conditions, could enter and make positive profits. In
addition, it is worth mentioning that in the process of shrinking the α and k, the k
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must be maintained to be suﬃciently high relative to the scale of parameter α. This is
reflected in the lower bound, 2A
β(2A+A)
, for the k. Otherwise, the entry cost loses its role
of creating entry barriers to the industry.
Furthermore, the results in Theorem 1 suggest that the long run survivors are pro-
ducing at a suboptimal scale of their outputs in the sense that their output levels are
less than their minimum eﬃcient scales. This is consistent with the well documented
empirical findings in the industrial organization literature (see Weiss (1963 and 1976),
Scherer (1973), and Pratten (1971)) that a majority of firms are not only small but
also suﬃciently small so as to operate at a suboptimal scale of output (instead of the
minimum eﬃcient scale) in most industries.
4 Conclusion
This paper builds a dynamic model of an industry where firms produce similar but
diﬀerentiated products. Firms have diﬀerent entry costs and average cost functions as
well. Firms face diﬀerent demand functions.
Conventionally, to achieve monopolistic competition, the key driving force is that
firms are assumed to maximize profits in their entry decision, in selecting output level
and in their decision of when to exit the industry (see Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson
(1933)). However, due to the recent criticism on firms’ rationality, this paper attempts
to explain monopolistic competition without purposive profit maximization assumption.
This is achieved by applying an evolutionary idea of natural selection to the industry
competition. Firms enter the industry regardless of the existence of profits; firms’ out-
puts are randomly determined rather than generated from profit maximization problems;
and firms exit the industry if their wealth is negative.
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A group of papers in this literature provide positive support to the hypothesis of the
"as if" profit maximizers as long run survivors through market selection argument. This
paper shows that not all of these firms will survive in this general setting of industry.
The only long run survivors are those that possess the most eﬃcient technology, face
the most favorable market conditions and produce at their profit maximizing outputs.
Moreover, at the aggregate level, monopolistic competition arises in the long run. This
paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic
competition. In addition, the results in this paper is consistent with the common
observation in the industrial organization that a majority of the firms are not only small
but also suﬃciently small so as to operate at suboptimal scale of output (instead of the
minimum eﬃcient scale) in most industries.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) The result can be obtained by replacing Qi with αQ∗i in
equation (4) and then applying equation (3) to the resulting equation.
(2) Rewrite equation (4) into the following:
Ciα(αQ
i) = Ci(Qi) + ai
¡
Qi −Q∗i
¢
− ai
¡
αQi − αQ∗i
¢
then taking a derivative of the above equation and then applying equation (2 ) results
in the following equation:
∂C iα(αQ i)
∂(αQ i)
|
αQi=αQ∗i
=
∂C i(Q i)
∂Q i
|
Q i=Q∗i
= −a i .
(3) Since Ciα(αQ∗i ) = c∗i for any i = 1, 2, ...,
∂Ciα(αQi)
∂(αQi) |
αQi=αQ∗i
= −ai; and ∂2Ciα(αQi)∂(αQi)2 >
0, the result follows.¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Substitute equations (1) and (4) into equation (5). Then use
the resulting equation and take the first order and the second order of firm i0s normalized
per unit of profit with respect to Qi. Finally apply property (2) of Proposition 2 along
with the assumption of ∂
2Ciα(αQi)
∂(αQi)2 > 0 to obtain equation (6).¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Since, conditional on ai and c∗i , the random draws of Qi
and the continuous average cost function Ci(·) are mutually independent, it follows that
Ci(αQi) has a strictly positive probability of taking a value in the interval [c∗i , c∗i + ],
where  is any given small positive number. It is also true that Ci(αQi) has a strictly
positive support at c∗. Finally, since Ai has a strictly positive support at A, and given
the fact that Ai is independent of all the random variables ai, c∗i , Qi, and Ci(·) and given
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the α−transformation of the average cost function, it follows that with a strictly positive
probability,
Pr
µ
Ciα(αQ
i) ∈ [c∗i , c∗i + ],
Ciα(αQi)
Ai
∈ [c
∗
A
,
c∗
A
+

A
]
¶
> 0.
Furthermore, given that the sequences {ai}i≥1 , {c∗i }i≥1 , {Qi}i≥1 and {Ci(·)}i≥1 are
independently and identically distributed, respectively; since Qi is independent of aj, c∗j
and Cj(·) for i, j = 1, 2, ...; the ai is independent of c∗j for all i and j; and the Ci(·) is
independent of aj and c∗j for i 6= j, it follows that there must exists a θ ∈ (0, 1) , such
that for i = 1, 2, ...,Pr
³
Ciα(αQi) ∈ [c∗i , c∗i + ], C
i
α(αQi)
Ai ∈ [
c∗
A
, c
∗
A
+ 
A
]
´
= θ.¥
Appendix B
Theorem 1 is directly established by using the results in two lemmas, namely, Lemma
1 and Lemma 2. Lemmas 1 and 2 are first proven.
For the purpose of simplifying the proof, denote qi = aiQi for any i, q∗i = aiQ∗i for any
i, and bj = B
j
aj for any j and furthermore, define q = aQ, q = aQ, q
∗ =a Q∗, q∗ = aQ
∗
,
b= Ba and b =
B
a . Therefore, firm i
0s demand function can be expressed, in terms of qi,
as follows:
P it (αQ
i) = P it (α
qi
ai
) = Ai
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1−
X
j∈St−1
j 6=i
bjαqj
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− αq
i,
where qi ∈ [q, q] and bj ∈ [b, b]. Similarly, firm i0s average cost function can also be
expressed, in terms of qi, as
Ciα(αQ
i) = Ciα(
αqi
ai
) = Ci(
qi
ai
) +
¡
qi − q∗i
¢
− α
¡
qi − q∗i
¢
.
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Define pit(αqi) = P it (α
qi
ai ) and define c
i
α(αqi) = Ciα(
αqi
ai ). Notice that for the above
transformation, ciα(αqi) =Ciα(αQi); therefore, ciα(αq∗i ) = Ciα(αQ∗i ) = Ci(Q∗i ) = c∗i .
pit(αqi) = P it (αQi). In addition, for any given α,
∂ciα(αqi)
∂(αqi)
|
αqi=αq∗i
=
∂pit(αqi)
∂(αqi)
= −1,
for any i = 1, 2, ... This means that the slope of a firm’s tangent line to its average cost
function at the output level of αq∗i is the same across all firms.
Furthermore, normalize the following variables by Ai. That is, define, for i = 1, 2, ...,
epit(αqi) = pit(αqi)Ai , eciα(αqi) = ciα(αqi)Ai , eqi = qiAi , eq∗i = q∗iAi , ec∗i = c∗iAi , eβi = βiAi . Denoteec∗ = c∗
A
, eq∗ = q∗
A
,eq∗ = q∗
A
, eβ = β
A
and eβ = β
A
. Hence, each firm’s demand function in
terms of epit(αqi) has the same base intercept.
For t = 1, 2, ..., define Itt as the following:
Itt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if ptt(αqt) ≥ ctα(αqt) + βtk
0 otherwise
If Itt = 1, then firm t makes a nonnegative profit on the entry period.
Lemma 1 establishes a lower bound for firms’ prices after shrinking firms’ size relative
to the market (i.e., α). The lower bounds are arbitrarily close to c∗ ( which is the
tangency of the most eﬃcient firms’ average cost curves to their respective demand
curves).
Denote St = {t} ∪ St−1 for t = 1, 2, ....
Lemma 1 For any given k, for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists an α such that,
for α < α, at any time period t, where t = 1, 2, ..., for i ∈ St,
epit(αqi) > ec∗ + α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢+ 0A.
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Proof. Define ebP t = Ã1−X
i∈St
bi(αqi)
!
, for t = 1, 2, ... (7)
Lemma 1 first proves the following claim.
Claim: For any given k, and for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists an α1 such
that for α < α1,
ebP t ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A , for all t = 1, 2, ....
Proof of Claim: This is shown by induction.
(1) The base step of the induction proof: The claim is true for t = 1. For any given
k, and for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, define α1 such that
−bα1q = α1eq∗ − 0A, or α1 = 0A ¡bq + eq∗¢ . (8)
Since ebP 1 = (1− b1αq1I11 ). This together with equation (8) and q1 ≤ q and A1 > c∗1+β1k
implies that ebP 1 ≥ 1− bαq > ec∗1 + αeq∗ + eβ1k − 0A > ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A , for α < α1.
(2) The induction step: Suppose that the claim is true for t = r, i.e., for any given
k, and for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists an α1 such that for α < α1, at time
period r, ebP r ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A. (9)
It is now shown that the claim is true for t = r + 1, i.e., for the given k, for the given
0 < A
?βk
2
, if α < α1, then at time period r + 1,
ebP r+1 ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A. (10)
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Using equation (7),
ebP r+1 = ebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 + X
i∈Xr+1
i6=r+1
bi
¡
αqi
¢
, (11)
where Xr+1 represents a set of firms that exit the industry at the end of time period
r + 1. Equation (11) further implies that
ebP r+1 ≥ ebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 . (12)
Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: Suppose that ebP r− br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 −αeqr+1 ≥ ec∗r+1+α ¡eq∗r+1 − eqr+1¢+ eβk− 0A .
Then, using the fact that ec∗r+1 ≥ ec∗, and eq∗r+1 ≥ eq∗, equation (12) implies that
ebP r+1 ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A.
That is, equation (10) holds.
Case 2: Suppose that
ebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 − αeqr+1 < ec∗r+1 + α ¡eq∗r+1 − eqr+1¢+ eβk − 0A. (13)
Notice that
pr+1r+1(αqr+1)
Ar+1
= epr+1r+1(αqr+1) =
Ã
1−
X
i∈Sr
bi(αqi)
!
− αeqr+1. (14)
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Using the definition of ebP r (see equation (7)),
ebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 − αeqr+1 =
Ã
1−
X
i∈Sr
bi(αqi)
!
− br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 − αeqr+1. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) imply that
pr+1r+1(αqr+1)
Ar+1
−
µebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 − αeqr+1¶ = br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 < bαq. (16)
Since, using the definition of α1 in equation (8), bα1q =
bqeq∗ + bq
µ
0
A
¶
<
0
A
, it follows
that for any α < α1,
bαq <
0
A
.
This together with equation (16) further implies that for α < α1,
pr+1r+1(αqr+1)
Ar+1
< ebP r − br+1αqr+1Ir+1r+1 − αeqr+1 + 0A. (17)
Using equations (13) and (17), it follows that for α < α1,
pr+1r+1(αqr+1)
Ar+1
< ec∗r+1 + α ¡eq∗r+1 − eqr+1¢+ eβk. (18)
Since properties (3) of the α-transformed cost function outlined in Proposition 1 in
Appendix A imply that any price for producing αQr+1 on the demand curve which is
tangent to the average cost curve at αQ∗r+1 is no higher than Cr+1α (αQr+1), equation
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(18), together with Ar+1eβ ≤ βr+1, implies that
pr+1r+1(αqr+1) < c∗r+1 + α
¡
q∗r+1 − qr+1
¢
+ βr+1k
≤ cr+1α (αqr+1) + βr+1k.
(19)
Equation (19) further implies that firm r+1 makes a negative profit in its entry period.
Therefore, firm r+1 must exit the industry at the end of its entry period r+1. That is,
Ir+1r+1 = 0.
Using equation (12), this in turn implies that
ebP r+1 ≥ ebP r,
which together with equation (9) further implies that for any α < α1,
ebP r+1 ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A.
Therefore, the claim holds.
Now, at time period t = 1, 2, ..., for any firm i ∈ St = {t} ∪ St−1,
pit(αqi)
Ai
=
ebP t−1 − α ¡eqi − biqi¢− btαqt.
23
This together with the result of the claim and with qt ≤ q implies that for any α < α1,
pit(αq
i)
Ai ≥ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk − 0A − α (eqi − biqi)− btαqt
= ec∗ + α (eq∗i − eqi) + α ¡eq∗ − eq∗i ¢+ eβk − 0A + αbiqi − btαqt
> ec∗ + α (eq∗i − eqi) + eβk − 0A − bαq − αeq∗.
(20)
Then, with 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists an α < α1 such that for α < α,
eβk − 0
A
−
³
bαq + αeq∗´ > 0
A
. (21)
Therefore, the result of Lemma 1 follows from equation (20) and (21).¥
Lemma 2 establishes a probabilistic upper bound for firms’ prices after a certain time
period for a suﬃciently small α. The upper bounds are arbitrarily close to the average
cost plus average entry cost of the firms producing at the tangency of their average cost
curves to their respective demand curves, possessing the most eﬃcient technology, and
facing the best market conditions. The driving force of this result is the allowance for the
entry of firms producing at the tangency of their average cost curves to their respective
demand curves, with the most eﬃcient technology (i.e., c∗) and facing the best market
conditions (i.e., A ). In other words, it is indirectly assumed that each time period with
a positive probability (however small) firms enter the industry with the most eﬃcient
technology (i.e., c∗) and facing the best market conditions (i.e., A ). These firms are
referred to as M-firms in the proof of Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 is done by way of
contradiction. It roughly says that the prices cannot be above the upper bounds after a
certain time period for a suﬃciently small α. If they do, then there will be a suﬃciently
large number of M-firms entering the industry over the time periods where the prices
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are above the upper bounds. Since these M-firms make positive profits in their entry
periods and in all subsequent time periods, they never exits the industry. Over time,
the presence of the suﬃciently large number of M-firms in the industry will drive all
prices below their lower bounds defined in Lemma 1. This is a contradiction.
Denote q = (q1, q2, ...) and Q = (Q1, Q2, ...).
Lemma 2 With probability 1, the following occurs: for any given k, and for any given
positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists an α, such that, for any α < α, there exists a time period
τ(0, q, k, α) such that, for t > τ(0, q, k, α), for all i ∈ St = {t} ∪ St−1,
epit(αqi) < ec∗ + α ¡eq∗i − eqi¢+ eβk + 0A + 0A
Proof. Define Mt, for t = 1, 2, ..., as
Mt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if ctα(αqt) ∈ [c∗t , c∗t + 0] and ectα(αqt) ∈ £ec∗,ec∗ + 0A¤
0 otherwise
where 0 is defined in Lemma 1. Using the result in Proposition 3, it follows that
Pr (Mt = 1) = θ and Pr (Mt = 0) = 1− θ for t = 1, 2, ... (22)
The firm with Mt = 1 is referred to as a M−firm. If Mt = 1, denote qM = qt andeqM = eqt. Hence eqM ≤ eq∗.
The proof begins by proving the following claim and the result in Lemma 2 follows
directly from this claim.
Claim: With probability 1, there is only a finite number of time periods, in which ebP t
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is above ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk + 0
A
. That is,
Pr
Ã ∞X
t=2
ht <∞
!
= 1, (23)
where for any t > 1, the random variable ht is defined to be 1 if at time t − 1, ebP t−1 is
above ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk + 0
A
for α < α and ht is defined to be 0 otherwise. (where α is
defined in Lemma 1.)
Proof of Claim: The proof is done by way of contradiction. Suppose that the claim
is not true, then for some δ > 0, Pr
µ ∞P
t=2
ht =∞
¶
> δ. This implies that for any given
integer J > 0, there exists a positive integer m0 ≥ J such that for m > m0, and, for
N(m) =
mP
t=2
ht,
Pr (N(m) ≥ J) > δ
2
. (24)
Now, construct a collection of random variables {fMt1 ,fMt2 , ...,fMtN(m)}, where, for i =
1, 2, ..., N(m), ti = mint{t : ht = 1, t > ti−1, t0 = 0} according to
fMti =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if Mti = 1
0 otherwise.
Since for i = 1, 2, ..., N(m), Mti is independent of hti (which is realized at ti − 1) and
since {Mt}t≥1 is independently and identically distributed, it follows that {fMti}N(m)i≥1 is
independently and identically distributed and furthermore, in each time period, Mt andfMt have the same distribution function. This together with equation (22) implies that,
Pr
³fMti = 1´ = θ and Pr³fMti = 0´ = 1− θ for i = 1, 2, ..., N(m).
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Since E(fMti) = θ, V ar(fMti) = θ(1− θ) and since θ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
V ar
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
fMti
⎞
⎠ < E
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
fMti
⎞
⎠ . (25)
Denote ZN(m) = E
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
fMti
!
. Using Chebyshev’s inequality, for any given positive
integer x < ZN(m),
Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
fMti ≤ x
!
≤ Pr
Ã¯¯¯¯
¯N(m)Pi=1 fMti − ZN(m)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≥ ZN(m) − x
!
≤
V ar
?
N(m)?
i=1
?Mti
?
(ZN(m)−x)
2
< ZN(m)
(ZN(m)−x)
2 (using equation (25))
This together with the fact that Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
fMti ≤ x
!
= 1 − Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
fMti > x
!
implies
that
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
fMti > x
⎞
⎠ > 1− ZN(m)¡
ZN(m) − x
¢2 .
Notice that as N(m) → ∞, ZN(m) → ∞ and
ZN(m)
(ZN(m)−x)
2 → 0. Hence, for any given
positive integer x and for any given positive y < 1, there exists a positive integer N,
such that for N(m) ≥ N,
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
fMti > x
⎞
⎠ > 1− y > 0. (26)
Define m, such that N(m) = N. Since
N(m)P
i=1
Mti =
N(m)P
i=1
fMti, using equation (26), it
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follows that for m > m,
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
Mti > x |N(m) = r
⎞
⎠ > 1− y, for r ≥ N. (27)
Using Proposition 4 in Appendix C, equation (27) also implies that
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
Mti > x
¯¯
N(m) ≥ N
⎞
⎠ > 1− y > 0. (28)
Set J = N in equation (24). Equation (24) means that for this given N, there exists a
positive m0 ≥ N, such that for m > m0,
Pr
¡
N(m) ≥ N
¢
>
δ
2
. (29)
Since for m > max(m0,m),
Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
Mti > x
!
≥ Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
Mti > x,N(m) ≥ N
!
= Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
Mti > x
¯¯
N(m) ≥ N
!
Pr
¡
N(m) ≥ N
¢
> (1− y) δ
2
, (using equations (28)and (29) ).
The above means that for any given positive integer x and for any given positive y < 1,
there exists an integer m0 = max(m0,m) such that for m > m0,
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
Mti > x
⎞
⎠ > (1− y)δ
2
> 0.
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This further implies that
Pr
Ã ∞X
i=1
Mti =∞
!
> 0. (30)
This means that with a strictly positive probability the number of M-firms goes to
infinity.
Now, if Mti = 1, then the firm that enters at time ti, where hti = 1, is a M-firm.
Consider this M-firm. When hti = 1, this implies that at time ti − 1,
ebP ti−1 is aboveec∗+αeq∗+eβk+ 0
A
. This, together with the property that for aM-firm ec∗+ 0
A
> ecMα (αqM),eqM ≤ eq∗, implies that
eptiti(αqti) |
qti=qM0
=
ebP t−1 − αeqM
> ec∗ + α ¡eq∗ − eqM¢+ eβk + 0
A
> ecMα (αqM) + eβMk.
This further implies that ptiti(αq
M) > ctiα(αqM)+β
tik. This means that thisM-firm’s per
unit revenue at its entry period ( which is ptiti(αq
M)) exceeds its per unit cost at its entry
period (which is ctiα(αqM) + β
tik). Hence, this M-firm makes a strictly positive profit in
its entry time period and it continues to produce in time period ti+1. Lemma 1 implies
that for this k and 0 and for any α < α, thisM-firm in any subsequent time periods has
its product price greater than per unit cost (which is no more than c∗+ 0) . In other
words, this M-firm makes a strictly positive profit in any subsequent time period after
its entry. Therefore, this M-firm never exits the economy. Equation (30) implies that
with a strictly positive probability there is an infinite number of such M-firms in the
economy. Since thoseM-firms never exit the economy and since each individualM-firm
produces at least αQ , the presence of the infinite number of such M-firms would drive
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the price for each of the producing firms, say firm i, below
c∗Ai
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + 0
with a strictly positive probability. This contradicts the result in Lemma 1. Therefore,
equation (23) follows.
Since epit(αqi) = ebP t−1 − αeqi + biαqi − btαqt and since from the proof of Lemma 1,
biαqi ≤ bαq ≤ 0A , equation (23) further implies that with probability 1 the following
occurs: for this k and 0 < A
?βk
2
and for any α < α, there must exist a time period, say
τ(0, q, k, α), such that for all t > τ(0, q, k, α), for all firms i ∈ St = {t} ∪ St−1,
epit(αqi) ≤ ec∗ + αeq∗ + eβk + 0A − αeqi + biαqi − btαqt
< ec∗ + α ¡eq∗ − eqi¢+ eβk + 0
A
+
0
A
≤ ec∗ + α (eq∗i − eqi) + eβk + 0A + 0A.
Therefore, Lemma 2 is proven.¥
The results in Theorem are directly established by bringing together the results in
Lemma 1 and 2 along with shrinking of the average entry cost k.
Proof of Theorem 1: (i(a)) Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it follows that with
probability 1, the following occurs: for any given k, for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
,
there exists an α such that, for α < α, there exists a time period τ(,Q, α, k) such that
for t > τ(0, Q, α, k),
c∗A
i
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + 0 < P it (αQi) < c∗A
i
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + βAA k + 0 +
A
A
0,
for all i ∈ St = {t} ∪ St−1.
Define k =
A
βA
0 and  = 0
³
2 + AA
´
. Then, it follows that with probability 1, the
following occurs: for any given positive , there exist positive numbers k and α such
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that, for 2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k and for α < α, there exists a time period τ(,Q, α, k) such
that for t > τ(,Q, α, k),
c∗Ai
A
+ aiα
¡
Q∗i −Qi
¢
< P it (αQ
i) <
c∗Ai
A
+ aiα(Q∗i −Qi) + , for all i ∈ St. (31)
Since τ(,Q, α, k) depends on the entire sample path Q = (Q1, Q2, ...), and not on
the distribution function F (·), from which the Q1, Q2, ..., are drawn, perhaps, for ex-
perimentation purposes, it is of more interest to know from what time period and on
that the price for each of the remaining firms, say firm i, is lying outside the inter-
val
µ
c∗Ai
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) ,
c∗Ai
A
+ aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + 
¶
with a certain given probability.
This can be done by applying to equation (31) the fact that almost sure convergence
implies convergence in probability. In other words, this results in Part (i(a)) of Theorem
1.
(i(b)) Lemma 1 shows that for any given k, for any given positive 0 < A
?βk
2
, there exists
an α such that for α < α, at any time period t, where t = 1, 2, ..., for i ∈ St = {t}∪St−1,
epit(αqi) > ec∗ + α ¡eq∗i − eqi¢+ 0A.
With c
∗
i
Ai <
c∗
A
+

2A+A
and since 0 =
µ
A
2A+A
¶
, then ec∗i + α (eq∗i − eqi) < epit(αqi). In
the original notation,
c∗i + a
iα
¡
Q∗i −Qi
¢
< P it (αQ
i). (32)
Furthermore, since c∗
Ai
A
≤ c∗i , Part (i(a)) of Theorem 1 implies that for any α < α and for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that, for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
¡
P it (αQ
i) < c∗i + a
iα
¡
Q∗i −Qi
¢
+ , for all i ∈ St.
¢
> 1− η. (33)
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Combining equations (32) and (33) along with the fact c
∗
i
Ai ≥
c∗
A
gives the results of Part
(i(b)) of Theorem.
(ii) The result in Part (i(a)) of Theorem 1 implies that for any given positive numbers
 and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α, for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
µec∗ < epit(αqi)− α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ < ec∗ + A, for all i ∈ St.
¶
> 1− η; (34)
For surviving firms, i ∈ St, epit(αqi)− eciα(αqi) ≥ 0. (35)
But, since ciα(αq∗i ) = c∗i ,
∂ciα(αqi)
∂(αqi) |
αqi=αq∗i
= −1, and ∂2ciα(αqi)∂(αqi)2 > 0, for any i = 1, 2, ...,
eciα(αqi) ≥ ec∗i + α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ . (36)
Combining equations (35) and (36), for all surviving firms i ∈ St,
epit(αqi)− α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ ≥ ec∗i . (37)
Since surviving firms at time t must also be producing firms at time t and since ec∗ ≤ ec∗i ,
therefore, combining equations (34) and (37), for any given positive numbers  and
η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α and for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
µec∗i ≤ epit(αqi)− α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ < ec∗i + A and ec∗ ≤ ec∗i < ec∗ + A for i ∈ St
¶
> 1− η.
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By equations (35) and (36), ec∗i ≤ eciα(αqi)−α (eqi∗ − eqi) ≤ epit(αqi)−α (eqi∗ − eqi) and sinceec∗ ≤ ec∗i , therefore,
Pr
µec∗i ≤ eciα(αqi)− α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ < ec∗i + A and ec∗ ≤ ec∗i < ec∗ + A for i ∈ St
¶
> 1− η.
Finally, in terms of the original notation, this implies that, for any given positive numbers
 and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α and for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
⎛
⎜⎝
ci∗ + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) ≤ Ciα(αQi) < ci∗ + aiα (Q∗i −Qi) + 
and
c∗i
Ai
<
c∗
A
+

A
, for all i ∈ St
⎞
⎟⎠ > 1− η.
(iii) The result in Part (i(a)) of Theorem 1 implies that for any given positive numbers
 and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α, for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
µec∗ < epit(αqi)− α ¡eqi∗ − eqi¢ < ec∗ + A, for all i ∈ St.
¶
> 1− η. (38)
Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: Suppose Ctα(αQt) /∈ [ct∗ + atα (Q∗t −Qt) , ct∗ + atα (Q∗t −Qt) + ). This
implies
ectα(αqt) /∈ hect∗ + α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢ , ect∗ + α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢+ At´ .
Since ciα(αq∗i ) = c∗i ,
∂ciα(αqi)
∂(αqi) |
αqi=αq∗i
= −1, and ∂2ciα(αqi)∂(αqi)2 > 0 for any i = 1, 2, ..., this means
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that
ectα(αqt) ≥ ect∗ + α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢+ At . (39)
Since ec∗ ≤ ect∗ and At ≤ A, equations (38) and (39) imply that
Pr
¡eptt(αqt)− α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢ < ectα(αqt)− α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢¢ > 1− η.
This in turn implies that
Pr
¡eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt) < 0¢ > 1− η.
Furthermore, since eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt)− eβtk < eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt), then
Pr
³eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt)− eβtk < 0´ > 1− η.
Thus,
Pr
¡
P tt (αQ
t)− Ctα(αQt)− βtk < 0
¢
> 1− η.
Case 2: Suppose
c∗t
At
≥ c
∗
A
+

A
andCtα(αQt) ∈ [ct∗ + atα (Q∗t −Qt) , ct∗+atα (Q∗t −Qt)
+) . This means that
ectα(αqt) ≥ ec∗t + α ¡eqt∗ − eqt¢ . (40)
If equation (40) is subtracted from equation (38), then for any given positive numbers
 and η ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive numbers α and k such that, for any α < α and for
2A
β(2A+A)
< k < k, there exists a time period τ(, η, α, k) such that for all t > τ(, η, α, k),
Pr
µeptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt) < ec∗ − ec∗t + A
¶
> 1− η.
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Since
c∗t
At
≥ c
∗
A
+

A
, it follows that ec∗ − ec∗t + A ≤ 0, then
Pr
¡eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt) < 0¢ > 1− η.
In turn, since eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt)− eβtk < eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt), it follows that
Pr
³eptt(αqt)− ectα(αqt)− eβtk < 0´ > 1− η.
Thus,
Pr
¡
P tt (αQ
t)− Ctα(αQt)− βtk < 0
¢
> 1− η.
The result in Part (iii) is proven.¥
Appendix C
Proposition 4
If
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
Mti > x |N(m) = r
⎞
⎠ > 1− y, for r ≥ N, (41)
then
Pr
⎛
⎝
N(m)X
i=1
Mti > x
¯¯
N(m) ≥ N
⎞
⎠ > 1− y.
35
Proof.
Pr
Ã
N(m)P
i=1
Mti > x
¯¯
N(m) ≥ N
!
=
Pr
?
N(m)?
i=1
Mti>x,(N(m)=N, or, N(m)=N+1, or, ...,or,N(m)=m)
?
Pr(N(m)=N, or, N(m)=N+1, or, ...,or,N(m)=m)
=
mP
r=N
Pr
?
N(m)?
i=1
Mti>x,N(m)=r
?
Pr(N(m)=N, or, N(m)=N+1, or, ...,or,N(m)=m)
=
mP
r=N
⎛
⎜⎝
Pr
?
N(m)?
i=1
Mti>x,N(m)=r
?
Pr(N(m)=r)
Pr(N(m)=r)
Pr(N(m)=N, or, N(m)=N+1, or, ...,or,N(m)=m)
⎞
⎟⎠
> (1− y)
mP
r=N
Pr(N(m)=r)
Pr(N(m)=N, or, N(m)=N+1, or, ...,or,N(m)=m)
(using eq. (41))
> (1− y).
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